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The rate of university patenting increased dramatically during the 1980s. To what extent did the knowledge
flow patterns associated with public sector inventions change as university administrators and faculty
seemingly became more commercially oriented? Using a Herfindahl-type measure of patent assignee
concentration and employing a difference-in-differences estimation to compare university to firm patents
across two time periods, we find that the university diffusion premium (the degree to which knowledge
flows from patented university inventions are more widely distributed across assignees than those
of firms) declined by over half during the 1980s. In addition, we find that the university diversity premium
(the degree to which knowledge inflows used to develop patented university inventions are drawn
from a less concentrated set of prior art holders than those used by firms) also declined by over half.
Moreover, in both cases the estimated increase in knowledge flow concentration is largely driven by
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Amongst the most striking developments on American university campuses over the past
quarter century has been the rapid rise of patenting to lay claim to and protect intellectual
property associated with novel and practical inventions developed by university researchers.
Indeed, in just 13 years, from 1980 to 1993, the number of patents issued annually to US
universities increased by 315%, from 390 to 1620.1 This dramatic shift in academic behavior
has been attributed to many factors. Principal among these are developments in the ﬁelds
of microbiology and computer science, an expansion in the range of patentable matter (e.g.,
genetically modiﬁed life forms, software), the creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, and, most commonly, the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act (1980), which granted
universities extensive rights to patent and retain ownership of innovations produced with
federal government funding.
Although many observers have characterized the dramatic rise of university patenting
as a windfall for the American economy - indeed, The Economist went as far as describing
the Bayh-Dole Act in particular as “possibly the most inspired piece of legislation to be
enacted in America over the past half century” and citing university-based innovation as
a key factor that facilitated America’s industrial renaissance in the 1980s2 - others have
expressed a variety of concerns, most of which can be grouped into one of three categories:
1) a shift in focus from “basic” to “applied” university research,3 2) a decline in quality of
university inventions, and 3) a decline in the dissemination of knowledge associated with
university inventions.
Surprisingly, given the increasing level of concern over university patenting expressed in
both policy circles and the popular press,4 the evidence to date oﬀers little support for the
1By comparison, the number of patents issued to other US non-government organizations increased by
only 48% over the same time period.
2“Innovation’s Golden Goose,” The Economist, December 14, 2002, Vol.365 (8303), p. 3.
3Notwithstanding Stokes’ legitimate grievances with respect to the basic/applied taxonomy (Stokes
(1997)), we reference it here since most of the discourse on this topic has characterized research this way.
4“Patent on Human Stem Cell Puts U.S. Oﬃcials in Bind,” New York Times, August 17, 2001, p. A1;
“University Resolves Dispute On Stem Cell Patent License” New York Times, January 10, 2002, p. C11;
2ﬁrst two of these concerns. The ﬁrst concern, that an increased focus on commercialization
may induce university researchers to divert their energies away from basic research (Cohen
et al. (1998); Henderson et al. (1998)), is predicated on the notion that it is more important
for universities to provide basic than applied research. This is because the market is more
likely to under-provide basic than applied research due to greater appropriability problems.
Basic research is important though, since it often provides knowledge for subsequent applied
research and product development, which in turn is the basis for long run productivity and
economic growth.
However, empirical studies that examine whether professors substitute patenting for pub-
lishing, a rough proxy for changes in research focus, do not provide evidence of such substi-
tution. Agrawal and Henderson (2002) examine the publishing and patenting output of elec-
trical engineering, computer science, and mechanical engineering faculty at a major research
institution (MIT) and present evidence suggesting that these two activities are complements
rather than substitutes. Furthermore, Markiewicz and DiMinin (2005) and Goldfarb et al.
(2006) examine the complement-substitute question more directly with data from a much
broader sample of university researchers and ﬁnd similar results. Moreover, these ﬁndings
are not speciﬁc to US universities; several studies that examine the patenting-publishing re-
lationship at various European institutions yield similar conclusions (VanLooy et al. (2005)
- K.U Leuven in Belgium; Buenstorf (2005) - Max Planck Institute in Germany; Carayol
(2005) - University Louis Pasteur in France; Breschi et al. (2005) and Calerini and Franzoni
(2004) - various institutions in Italy).
The second concern is predicated on the notion that an increased focus on commercial-
ization may induce researchers to shift resources towards the disclosure and patenting of
lower quality inventions (Henderson et al. (1998)).5 However, evidence presented by Mowery
et al. (2004) shows that although the quality of inventions did decline after 1980, this was
“Bayhing for blood or Doling out cash?” The Economist, December 24, 2005, p. 115; Lieberwitz (2005);
“Lilly Loses Patent Case to Ariad,” New York Times, May 5, 2006, p. C1.
5The quality of inventions is measured by “importance,” reﬂected by a count of subsequent citations, and
“generality,” reﬂected by the dispersion of citations received from patents in diﬀerent technology ﬁelds.
3due to the entry of universities with little patenting experience; it was not due to a general
decline in quality of inventions patented by all universities. The implication of this ﬁnding
is that the estimated decline is likely to be only temporary, while inexperienced universities
learn the patenting process and how to most eﬀectively manage their intellectual property
portfolio.
Thus, it is only the third concern, relating to how the anti-commons limits the ﬂow of
knowledge, that has found traction in empirical evidence. In a study employing a diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences identiﬁcation based on patent-paper pairs, Murray and Stern (2005) report
ﬁndings that although publications linked to patents are associated with a higher overall
citation rate, after the patent is actually issued, the rate declines substantially (by 9-17%).
The authors note that the decline is particularly salient for articles authored by researchers
with public sector aﬃliations, such as university professors. They interpret their ﬁndings as
evidence of an anti-commons eﬀect that results from moving intellectual property from the
public into the private domain.
Our paper further addresses the third concern: restricting the widespread ﬂow of knowl-
edge associated with university inventions. However, where Murray and Stern focus on the
decline in the level of knowledge ﬂows, we focus on the narrowing of knowledge ﬂows to a
smaller set of recipients. Speciﬁcally, we examine whether, over time and conditional on be-
ing patented, university inventions are more likely to be cited by a more concentrated set of
subsequent patent owners. Such a ﬁnding could reﬂect the outcome of a change in the man-
agement objectives of university intellectual property from broad knowledge dissemination
towards limiting access, perhaps to maximize private returns to licensors.
Using a Herﬁndahl-type measure of patent assignee concentration associated with for-
ward citations as a dependent variable and employing a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimation
(taking the diﬀerence of the change in concentrations over time between university versus
ﬁrm patents), we estimate that the university diﬀusion premium (the degree to which knowl-
edge ﬂows from patented university inventions are more widely distributed across assignees
4than those of ﬁrms) declined by over half between the early and late 1980s. Furthermore,
unlike the decline in invention quality that occurred during the 1980s that Mowery et al
found to be due to the entry of inexperienced universities, the increase in knowledge ﬂow
concentration we discover is largely driven by experienced universities; this ﬁnding suggests
that the phenomenon we identify is unlikely to disappear with time but may actually increase
as inexperienced universities become more like their experienced counterparts with respect
to the manner in which they manage their intellectual property.
In addition to examining the pattern of knowledge ﬂowing out from university inventions,
we also study the pattern of ﬂows into these inventions. Although the approach we employ
to examine inﬂows is similar to the one we use to examine outﬂows, the phenomenon itself is
distinct. Relative to ﬁrms, we expect universities draw from a wider set of prior art holders
since academia is largely shielded from the anti-commons problem. This problem occurs
when prior art is strongly enforced and widely distributed (Heller and Eisenberg (1998);
Argyres and Liebskind (1998); David (2001); David (2003); Lessig (2002); Etzkowitz (1998);
Krimsky (2003)).
Under these conditions, Cournot’s “complements problem” can arise (Shapiro (2001)).
Each upstream patent owner prices royalties without coordinating with owners of comple-
mentary patents. Without coordination, the marginal cost of utilizing complementary tech-
nologies is higher than if all patents were owned by a single agent. Moreover, a larger number
of prior art holders may simply increase transactions costs incurred negotiating the rights to
use the complementary technologies required to practice the invention (Ziedonis (2004)).
While ﬁrms may consciously conduct R&D with this in mind to minimize exposure to the
anti-commons,6 university researchers are largely insulated for two reasons. First, universities
have traditionally been shielded from patent infringement liability due to the “experimental
6For example, from the outset of Kodak’s eﬀorts to develop its instant photography technology, the ﬁrm
employed its legal counsel to work along with its R&D engineers to minimize the likelihood that any new
technology would infringe on existing Polaroid patents (Warshofsky (1994); Rivette and Kline (2000); Jaﬀe
and Lerner (2004)). In addition, Hall and Ziedonis (2001) and Ziedonis (2004) present evidence suggesting
that ﬁrms building on prior art that is more fragmented patent more aggressively in order to facilitate
cross-licensing and mitigate against potential infringement costs.
5use exemption” (Eisenberg (2003)). Under this doctrine, otherwise infringing activity is
permitted if it occurs “for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical
inquiry.”7 Second, to the extent that university researchers choose their research projects to
advance knowledge and only concern themselves with patenting ex post – after something
they have discovered is shown to work and oﬀer commercial potential – their project selection
and prior art decisions will not be inﬂuenced by concerns about potential hold-up during the
subsequent product development phase.
However, as university patenting rises during the 1980s, we ﬁnd that university researchers
tend to draw from a more concentrated set of prior art holders. Speciﬁcally, our results
suggest that the university diversity premium (the degree to which knowledge inﬂows used
to develop patented university inventions are drawn from a less concentrated set of prior
art holders than those used by ﬁrms) declined by over half between the early 1980s and
early 1990s. Furthermore, similar to the case of knowledge outﬂows described above, the
estimated increase in knowledge inﬂow concentration is driven by experienced universities,
again suggesting that this phenomenon is not likely to dissipate with experience but may
actually increase over time.
This ﬁnding may reﬂect a change over time in the manner in which university researchers
conduct research. Rather than merely worrying about the patentability of an invention ex
post, researchers may increasingly plan research projects with an eye towards commercial-
ization. If motivated by pecuniary gains, as evidence reported by Lach and Schankerman
(2005) suggests, academic researchers will look forward, anticipating the burden of future li-
censees, and reason backwards that the value of their intellectual property could be increased
if they are able to plan their research approach so as to narrow the scope of prior art holders
associated with complementary technologies.
Like Murray and Stern, our ﬁndings suggest caution with respect to the increasing ten-
7Walsh et al. (2005) present evidence suggesting that university researchers pay little attention to patents
protecting research tools and are unlikely to modify their research due to impediments posed by existing
patents. These ﬁndings are particularly interesting since they are based on data reﬂecting attitudes after
the Madey v. Duke verdict of 2003.
6dency to patent university research. However, our ﬁndings are quite distinct. Their paper
shows the impact of patenting on knowledge dissemination: an overall reduction in the level
of knowledge outﬂows. Our results suggest that, conditional on patenting and controlling
for a reduction in overall ﬂow levels, the management of knowledge ﬂows both to and from
universities has resulted in an increasing concentration of ﬂows over time.
This behavior seems counter to the stated mandate of most US universities, which is often
some permutation of maximizing the dissemination of new knowledge that results from their
research. While the welfare implications of our ﬁndings are non-obvious - limiting access
to new knowledge can be welfare enhancing if the welfare lost to those denied access is less
than the welfare gained by those who are granted exclusivity to invest in commercialization
(Colyvas et al. (2002); Mazzoleni (2005); Agrawal and Garlappi (2007)) - our results are con-
sistent with the view that universities are increasingly managing their intellectual property
like proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms rather than as welfare maximizing public institutions.
These trends in university knowledge ﬂows are important to identify and understand
because they have real implications for science policy and economic growth. Precisely because
of their non-commercial focus and their welfare enhancing objectives, universities play a
unique and important role in the national innovation system (Nelson (1993); Nelson (1996)).
They receive extensive government funding to produce basic knowledge that is intended to
be widely disseminated.8 It is in this context that universities have historically contributed
to economic growth and welfare (Henderson et al. (1998)). To the extent that knowledge
spillovers are indeed central to economic growth (Romer (1986); Romer (1990)), the ﬁnding
that university ﬂows, at least those associated with patented inventions, are narrowing throws
into question the traditionally conceived arrangement between academia and society.9
8From 1980 to 1993, universities received approximately $103 billion (constant 1996 dollars) from all levels
of government to fund basic R&D. This represents approximately 45% of all basic research undertaken in
the US (National Science Board (2004)).
9As a current example of a public response to this trend, the National Institute of Health (NIH), a major
US government funding agency, recently issued new guidelines urging universities to increase the frequency
with which they license genomic, NIH-funded, patented inventions on a non-exclusive, rather than exclusive,
basis (National Institute of Health (2005)).
7The remainder of our paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we describe our empirical
methodology, particularly the construction of our dependent variable, the “fragmentation
index.” In Section 3 we describe the patent citation data that we use to construct our
measures. In Section 4 we present our empirical results for both knowledge outﬂows and
inﬂows as well as provide examples to better understand the meaning of the estimated
coeﬃcients. Finally, in Section 5, we conclude by oﬀering some possible explanations for our
ﬁndings and directions for future research.
2 Methodology
Our empirical objective is to test whether knowledge ﬂows associated with patented uni-
versity inventions become more concentrated over time. Thus, most importantly, we need
to employ an estimation technique that facilitates the clean identiﬁcation of a change in
the concentration of knowledge ﬂows over time that is university-speciﬁc. Furthermore, we
require an appropriate measure of knowledge ﬂow concentration. We describe each of these
in turn.
2.1 Estimation
In order to estimate university speciﬁc changes in concentration of knowledge ﬂows over
time, we analyze data from two distinct periods.10 We deﬁne these as Period 1 (1980-1983)
and Period 2 (1986-1989).11 In order to identify changes in concentration that are university
speciﬁc as opposed to general changes in ﬂow patterns, we employ a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
estimation (taking the diﬀerence of the change in concentrations over time between university
versus ﬁrm patents). In addition, we include control variables to address speciﬁc dimensions
10As described in the introduction, we are interested in university-speciﬁc changes in the concentration of
both knowledge outﬂows and inﬂows. Since the estimation procedure is almost identical, we describe the
outﬂows case only and comment in footnotes where the methodology diﬀers for inﬂows.
11In the case of knowledge inﬂows, we deﬁne Period 2 as 1990-1993 since we use backward citations and
thus are not restricted by the data set ending in 1999.
8along which it is plausible that universities systematically patent diﬀerently than ﬁrms (e.g.,
inventions that are more important, more basic, or more likely from a particular technology
ﬁeld).
Thus, we estimate the following relationship:
Fragp = F(αo + α1Dp + α2ERAp + α3DpERAp + Xpα4 + XpERApα5) + εp (1)
where Fragp measures the fragmentation of ownership dispersion of patents building upon
patent p (“forward fragmentation” of knowledge outﬂows).12 Dp is a university dummy
variable that takes a value of one if p is assigned to a university and zero otherwise. ERAp
identiﬁes patents that were issued in Period 2 (i.e., ERAp = 1 if patent p was issued in 1986-
1989 and zero otherwise).13 Xp is a vector of variables that control for non-institutional
factors that may also aﬀect fragmentation. Finally, εp is a mean zero random error.
We use Equation 1 to test whether the university dummy explains some of the fragmen-
tation of knowledge ﬂows, Fragp. The sign and signiﬁcance of ˆ α1 oﬀers insight into the
relationship between institution type and the patterns of related knowledge ﬂows. If ˆ α1 is
such that the marginal eﬀect of the university dummy is positive,
F(ˆ αo + ˆ α1 + Xpˆ α4) − F(ˆ αo + Xpˆ α4) > 0,
and statistically signiﬁcant we will interpret this as suggestive evidence that university knowl-
edge ﬂows are less concentrated than those of ﬁrms, at least in Period 1.14 This ﬁnding would
be consistent with our prior beliefs about the diﬀerences between university and ﬁrm knowl-
edge ﬂows.
To identify how any initial diﬀerence in knowledge ﬂows between universities and ﬁrms
12Similarly, for the case of knowledge inﬂows, Fragp measures the fragmentation of prior art holders upon
which patent p builds (backward fragmentation).
13For the case of knowledge inﬂows, the dummy variable ERAp distinguishes patents that were applied for
in Period 2 (i.e., ERAp = 1 if patent p was submitted to the patent oﬃce in 1990-1993 and is zero otherwise).
14In this case, ERAp = 0 because we are analyzing patents in Period 1.
9have changed over time, we focus on ˆ α3, the coeﬃcient on the interaction between the
university dummy variable, Dp, and ERAp. If ˆ α3 is such that,





F(ˆ αo + ˆ α1 + Xpˆ α4) − F(ˆ αo + Xpˆ α4)

< 0,
we will interpret this as indicating that the change in the diﬀerence between university
and ﬁrm knowledge dispersion over time is negative; in other words, knowledge ﬂows from
university patents have become disproportionately more concentrated.
2.2 Variables
We construct each of our variables using information found on the front page of the patents
in our data. When a patent is issued, a substantial amount of information regarding the
innovation embodied by the patent is disclosed, including the technology ﬁeld,15 the assignee
name (i.e., the patent’s owner), and all prior patents on which the given innovation builds
(i.e., prior art citations). These citations are important for our study because they trace the
knowledge ﬂows between patents;16 they may also indicate complementary technologies that
15Technology ﬁelds are determined by the US Patent and Trademark Oﬃce (USPTO) and are analogous
to industry classes in an industry classiﬁcation system such as the Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (SIC).
Technology classes, however, do not map readily to any one industry because a given innovation can be
applied in a wide range of industries. See Kortum and Putnam (1997) for details regarding technology
ﬁeld-industry concordances.
16We use patent citations as a proxy for knowledge ﬂows. However, citations are not straightforward to
interpret in terms of direct knowledge ﬂows, and the signal-to-noise ratio for this measure is therefore likely
to be rather low. Patents cite other patents as “prior art,” with citations serving to delineate the property
rights conferred. Some citations are supplied by the applicant, others by the patent examiner, and some
patents may be cited more frequently than others because they are more salient in terms of satisfying legal
deﬁnitions of prior art rather than because they have greater technological signiﬁcance. Cockburn et al.
(2002) report, for example, that some examiners have “favorite” patents that they cite preferentially because
they “teach the art” particularly well. Nonetheless, Jaﬀe et al. (2002) surveyed cited and citing inventors to
explore the “meaning of patent citations” and found that approximately one-quarter of the survey responses
corresponded to a “fairly clear spillover,” approximately one-half indicated no spillover, and the remaining
quarter indicate some possibility of a spillover. Based on their survey data, the authors conclude: “We
believe that these results are consistent with the notion that citations are a noisy signal of the presence of
spillovers. This implies that aggregate citation ﬂows can be used as proxies for knowledge-spillover intensity,
for example, between categories of organizations or between geographic regions” (p. 400).
10may need to be used to practice the invention.17 As such, while a patent grants the assignee
the right to exclude others from practicing the invention described in the patent, it does not
necessarily grant the owner the right to practice the invention without the permission of cited
assignees. Consequently, citing assignees can be used as a proxy for potential licensees. As
indicated by Ziedonis (2004) and Rivette and Kline (2000), this is how some IP consulting
ﬁrms have come to use citations.18
2.2.1 Dependent Variable
Our dependant variable, a measure of the concentration of knowledge ﬂows, is constructed
in the spirit of the “fragmentation index” developed in Ziedonis (2004). Again, we describe
only the knowledge outﬂows measure, or forward fragmentation, ForFragi,p, given that the
backward measure, BackFragi,p is deﬁned analogously using the citations a patent makes
rather than receives.
Forward fragmentation measures the ownership dispersion of subsequent patents that
cite a focal patent. Speciﬁcally, for a focal patent p issued to assignee i, the fragmentation












where J is the set of assignees whose patents cite the focal patent, i / ∈ J, and Cj,i,p are all
citations made to p by patents belonging to assignee j ∈ J. In Equation 2, Ci,p is the total





Our fragmentation variable simply measures dispersion as the expected probability that
17This point is made in Ziedonis (2004).
18These ﬁrms use citations to assess potential licensees and to determine what patents are best to renew
or to allow to lapse.
11two randomly selected citations made to a given patent refer to citing patents issued to
two diﬀerent assignees.19,20 Consequently, the measure’s range of possible values is the unit
interval. For patents that have more widely distributed knowledge outﬂows (i.e., higher
fragmentation), the probability that any two sampled citations belong to diﬀerent assignees
will be closer to one. Conversely, the probability of this event will be closer to zero the more
concentrated the citing intellectual property is.
To gain a better intuition for interpreting this dispersion index, which is related to the
familiar Herﬁndahl concentration measure, consider the following three examples of focal
patents that are each cited by 10 patents (i.e., Ci,p = 10). First, suppose the focal patent
is cited by 10 patents that are all issued to IBM, J = {IBM}. In this case, citing patents
are perfectly concentrated and thus make it impossible for any two citations to refer to
diﬀerent assignees, ForFragi,p = 0. Next, suppose the focal patent receives ﬁve citations
each from two diﬀerent assignees. This yields an intermediate measure of fragmentation; the
probability that any two of the 10 citations are made by diﬀerent assignees is approximately
half, ForFragi,p ' 0.556.21 Finally, suppose the focal patent is cited once each by 10 diﬀerent
19This is a traditional interpretation for dispersion measures of the type deﬁned by Equation 2. See
Easterly and Levine (1997) for an example of this interpretation in the context of measuring ethnic diversity.
20With this interpretation, one can easily understand the fragmentation measure deﬁned by Equation 2.
Due to the count nature of citations (i.e., too few citations are typically made to make sampling with re-
placement an appropriate assumption), the conditional probability that two citing patents belong to diﬀerent
assignees, given that one of these two citations is known to belong to assignee j, is:











































Ci,p−1 in Equation 2 corrects the empirical probability had we assumed that we could sample with
replacement. Without this adjustment, our dispersion measure would be biased toward zero. This is the
same adjustment recommended by Hall et al. (2002).
21Forfragi,p = (1 − 2( 5
10)2)10
9 ' 0.556.
12assignees. In this case, it is certain that any two citations will come from diﬀerent assignees,
ForFragi,p = 1.
2.2.2 Control variables
Our identiﬁcation of university speciﬁc fragmentation is based on a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
estimation that compares diﬀerences in fragmentation over time between universities and
ﬁrms. This approach is used to “diﬀerence out” overall changes in knowledge ﬂow fragmen-
tation that are not university speciﬁc. However, it may be the case that identiﬁed changes in
university knowledge ﬂow fragmentation are the result of certain characteristics of university
patents rather than institutional characteristics of universities themselves. For example, it
may be the case that the probability of generating a “general purpose” patent increased less
over time for universities than for ﬁrms and that general purpose patents are more likely
to generate diﬀused knowledge outﬂows due to their wide applicability. This could appear
as a university speciﬁc increase in knowledge ﬂow concentration over time, but is actually a
“generality” eﬀect rather than an institutional eﬀect caused by a change in the management
practices of university intellectual property. Similarly, it may be the case that the probabil-
ity of generating a biotechnology patent increased more over time for universities than ﬁrms
and that biotechnology patents are more likely to generate concentrated knowledge outﬂows.
Again, this could appear as a university speciﬁc increase in knowledge ﬂow concentration
over time but is actually a biotechnology eﬀect.22
We control for these and several other possible confounding eﬀects. Speciﬁcally, we control
for four invention speciﬁc characteristics: 1) generality, 2) technology ﬁeld, 3) importance,
and 4) university science.23 First, “generality” is constructed using the same citations used to
22We acknowledge that universities might manage their entire patent portfolio in a manner that inﬂuences
knowledge ﬂow concentration. However, our analysis focuses on how universities manage patents individually.
For example, over time a university might allocate technology transfer resources more heavily towards a
particular ﬁeld, such as biotechnology. If biotechnology patents generate more concentrated knowledge
ﬂows, this would aﬀect our dependent variable but the variance would be captured by the technology ﬁeld
coeﬃcient rather than the coeﬃcient of interest, the coeﬃcient on the university dummy. Thus, we may
underestimate the university management eﬀect.
23In the case of inﬂows, we control for “originality” rather than generality and “citations made” rather
13calculate the dependant variable. However, rather than measuring the dispersion of citations
received from diﬀerent assignees, this control measures dispersion of citations received from
diﬀerent technology ﬁelds deﬁned by the US Patent and Trademark Oﬃce (USPTO) three-
digit technology classiﬁcation system.24
Second, we include technology ﬁeld ﬁxed eﬀects using dummy variables coinciding with
the NBER two-digit technology ﬁeld classiﬁcation.25 Third, we control for invention im-
portance using a simple count of total citations received by the focal patent.26 Finally, we
control for the degree to which a patent is cited by universities as a factor inﬂuencing frag-
mentation. We control for this with a variable representing the share of citations received
from university patents. This variable controls for any systematic “university science” eﬀect
that might induce innovators to be cited by a smaller (or larger) group of assignees (i.e.,
universities).
3 Data
We collect our data primarily from the NBER patent database described by Hall et al.
(2002). This source provides all the raw citation data needed to construct the variables in
our samples. In addition, we use the report “US Colleges and Universities-Utility Patent
Grants, Calendar Years 1969-2000”27 to identify all US university patents granted from 1969
to 1999.28
than importance. These measures are similar in spirit.
24“Generality” reﬂects the extent to which the knowledge embedded in a focal patent is applicable across
other technology ﬁelds (Trajtenberg et al. (1997)).
25Our conclusions are robust to using more disaggregated technology ﬁeld ﬁxed eﬀects; dummy variables
based on the USPTO three-digit technology classiﬁcation codes do not change our conclusions.
26The generality and importance measures, as described in Hall et al. (2002), have been widely used in
the patent-based economics of innovation literature.
27This source is produced by the Information Products Division, Technology Assessment and Forecast
Branch (2002).
28When referring to universities, we refer to universities, colleges, polytechnics, other post-secondary in-
stitutions, and university consortia.
143.1 Sample Construction
Since we ask two diﬀerent but related questions concerning changes in the concentration
of university knowledge outﬂows and university knowledge inﬂows, we require two distinct
samples. Although the sample construction process used for each is similar, there are a few
key diﬀerences. Thus, we describe each separately below.
3.1.1 Knowledge Outﬂows Sample
This sample is composed of a subset of all utility patents issued to US non-government
organizations by the USPTO.29 Speciﬁcally, we collect patents issued during the periods
1980-1983 and 1986-1989. This results in 241,929 patents. Furthermore, of this set of patents,
we only keep those that receive at least two citations since our forward fragmentation and
generality measures are undeﬁned otherwise.30,31
Next, we deﬁne the speciﬁc citations we consider. We ignore self-citations because we are
interested in how knowledge ﬂows between agents in the economy.32 Furthermore, we do not
consider citations received from patents applied for before the focal patent was issued. We do
this because we assume that citations from such patents are unlikely to represent knowledge
ﬂows due to the secrecy usually maintained during the patenting process. Finally, due to
truncation issues, we remove citations that come from patents issued more than 10 years after
the focal patent issue date.33 Consequently, by only keeping patents that receive at least two
“allowable” citations, we are left with a ﬁnal sample containing 173,499 focal patents that
29A utility patent is a patent protecting a process, machine, composition of matter, or an improvement of
any one of these things.
30This is obvious from the deﬁnition of our forward fragmentation measure deﬁned in Equation 2.
31It is diﬃcult to deduce what bias these exclusions introduce into our results. Other studies that use
these measures confront similar problems (e.g., Mowery et al. (2004)). Thus, it is important to note that our
results may only apply to patents that receive at least two citations and, in the case of inﬂows, to patents
that make at least two citations.
32A self-citation is a citation received from a patent issued to the same assignee as the focal patent.
33We choose 10 years since the NBER patent database contains citation data up to 1999. Since our focal
patents can be issued as early as 1980 and as late as 1989, the earlier patents would have nine more years to
accumulate citations if we did not truncate our citation window to 10 years. Since we focus on the diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences estimation, this issue is likely less of a problem, but we truncate the data in case university
patents diﬀer systematically from ﬁrm patents along this dimension.
15are, on average, referenced by 7.88 citing patents.
3.1.2 Knowledge Inﬂows Sample
This sample is also composed of a subset of all USPTO utility patents issued to US non-
government organizations. In this case we collect patents applied for during 1980-1983 and
1990-1993. This results in 289,894 focal patents. Next, similar to the outﬂows sample
construction, we remove patents that do not make at least two citations since our dependant
variable, BackFrag, as well as our measure of originality are undeﬁned for these patents.
Thus, by construction, each focal patent in our sample cites at least two patents. More-
over, as in the earlier case, we only consider citations with particular characteristics. Since we
are concerned about potential anti-commons eﬀects on knowledge inﬂows, we only consider
cited patents that can potentially hold-up the utilization of follow-on inventions. Therefore,
we focus on cited patents not owned by the focal assignee and that were issued before (but no
more than 10 years before) the application of the focal patent. We consider these citations
because they are particularly salient in terms of potential for impeding the utilization of the
new invention.34 Removing focal patents that make less than two “allowable” citations, we
generate a ﬁnal sample that includes 201,433 focal patents that, on average, cite 5.79 prior
patents.
3.2 Data limitations
Though rich, our data has limitations. Most notably, some of the patents in the data
do not include assignee information. This is important since our dependent variable, the
fragmentation index, is constructed using this information.35 As described in Hall et al.
34For example, an IBM patent applied for in 1980 might cite a Texas Instrument patent issued in 1969,
an Intel patent issued in 1973, an IBM patent issued in 1978, and an AMD patent issued in 1981. Of these
cited patents, we remove all but the Intel patent because it is less than 10 years old and so is likely to remain
enforced by the time the focal invention is practiced and because it is not owned by IBM. Furthermore,
unlike the AMD patent, the Intel patent was issued early enough that it could be observed by IBM and thus
could have inﬂuenced IBM’s decision to develop and ultimately patent the focal invention.
35For example, when calculating the forward fragmentation measure, we need to know ownership informa-
tion for the focal patent and for each of the citing patents.
16(2002), 18.4% of all patents in the NBER database have unidentiﬁed owners.
However, we take a number of steps to minimize this problem. First, by construction, we
only use focal patents for which we have assignee information. Recall that our initial set of
patents is drawn from patents issued to US non-government organizations. Thus, only our
citing patents may be missing assignee information.36 Next, since we apply a 10-year window
for constructing our backward fragmentation index and older patents are more likely to be
missing assignee information, we further limit our exposure to this problem.
In addition, we utilize inventor name data that is also provided by the NBER database.37
We use this information to obtain a better measure of fragmentation for patents that are
cited by more than one unassigned patent. In these cases, we group the unassigned citations
by the ﬁrst inventor of the unassigned patents. For example, if a sampled patent cites
two unassigned patents, both with the same ﬁrst inventor, we treat these two citations as
belonging to the same assignee.
Thus, as a result of these measures, only 13.3% of the citations made by our sampled
patents are to unassigned patents and only 12.0% of citations received are from unassigned
patents. Alternatively, each sampled patent, on average, cites 0.80 unassigned patents and
receive 0.85 citations from unassigned patents. Finally, when calculating our fragmentation
measure, we assume unassigned patents are not self-citations and that each belongs to a
diﬀerent assignee. However, as a robustness check, we also estimate our key models using
fragmentation measures constructed by instead assuming that all unassigned patents belong
to a single assignee; our results do not change. In addition, we further check robustness by
limiting our sample to only those focal patents that are cited by patents with full assignee
information; our results persist.38
A second limitation of the data is the absence of ownership transfer information. Our
fragmentation measure is calculated based on the assignee identiﬁed at the time each patent is
36Similarly, for the knowledge inﬂows case, only our cited patents may be missing assignee information.
37The NBER patent database provides the inventor name(s) for all patents issued after 1974.
38We similarly check robustness for the knowledge inﬂows case by limiting our sample to only those focal
patents that cite patents with full assignee information, and again our results persist.
17issued. However, Serrano (2005) ﬁnds that the sale and purchase of patents is not uncommon.
This would only pose a problem if the likelihood of ownership transfer (speciﬁcally the type
that would cause a change in fragmentation) changed at a diﬀerent rate for universities than
ﬁrms. The literature on this topic is limited and does not indicate whether this is the case.
Moreover we do not have access to ownership transfer data to check; thus, we note this as a
caveat for interpreting our results and an issue warranting further research.
4 Results
4.1 Summary Statistics
We present summary statistics on Table 1 conﬁrming the ﬁndings of Henderson et al. (1998)
that university patents are more important, general, and original than ﬁrm patents. Be-
ginning with Panel A, which presents data for the knowledge outﬂows sample, we see that
university patents are more important (they receive more citations) in both Periods 1 and
2. For example, the average university patent receives 35% more citations than the average
ﬁrm patent in Period 1 and 32% more citations in Period 2. Similarly, university patents are
more general in both periods. Turning to Panel B, we see that university patents are also
more original, and this diﬀerence seems to increase over time.
Next, we consider our variable of interest - the fragmentation index. Beginning with Panel
A, we see that knowledge outﬂows from university patents are more fragmented than their
private sector counterparts in Period 1. (We explain how to interpret the diﬀerence in index
values in Section 4.4.) However, this diﬀerence seems to disappear by Period 2. Similarly, in
Panel B, we see that knowledge inﬂows to university patents are more fragmented than those
to ﬁrm patents in Period 1. Again, however, this diﬀerence seems to disappear by Period 2.
Although these statistics are suggestive of a change in university behavior concerning the
management of knowledge ﬂows associated with patented inventions, changes in institution-
related fragmentation measures could be confounded with changes in non-institutional factors
18(such as technology ﬁeld portfolio) as we note in the methodology section above. Thus, we
turn next to regression analysis, which allows us to control for key invention characteristics.
4.2 Regression Analysis: Dispersion of Knowledge Outﬂows
We report the estimated OLS coeﬃcients of Equation 1 for the knowledge outﬂows sample in
Table 2. Recall that the dependent variable in this case is ForFragi,p. Referencing the fully
speciﬁed model reported in Column IV, we see from the estimated coeﬃcient on the university
dummy that university patents in Period 1 are more fragmented than their private sector
counterparts, even after controlling for the importance, generality, and technology ﬁeld of the
invention. We refer to this diﬀerence – the degree to which knowledge ﬂows from patented
university inventions are more widely distributed across assignees than those of ﬁrms – as
the university diﬀusion premium.
Turning to the coeﬃcient on the interaction between the university dummy and the Period
2 dummy (ERA), we see that the university diﬀusion premium is signiﬁcantly diminished by
the second period. In fact, by comparing the magnitudes of this coeﬃcient with the coeﬃcient
on the university dummy (with no interaction), we see that the university diﬀusion premium
measured in Period 1 is reduced by approximately 74% by Period 2. By comparison, other
characteristics of university patents, such as their tendency to be more general than ﬁrm
patents, remain virtually unchanged over this period.
This is our main result with respect to the increasing concentration of knowledge outﬂows
from university patents. We check for robustness in a number of ways. First, we show that
the result holds in various speciﬁcations of Equation 1, which are also reported in Panel A
of Table 2. We also conﬁrm that the result holds using diﬀerent procedures for handling
unassigned patents.39 Furthermore, the result holds when we use ﬁner technology class ﬁxed
eﬀects based on the USPTO three-digit classiﬁcation system. Finally, due to the nature of
the dependent variable, we estimate Equation 1 using Fractional Logit rather than OLS.
39Speciﬁcally, we treat all unassigned patents as if they are from the same assignee and, separately, we
drop all observations for which one or more of the citing patents is unassigned. The result is robust.
19Again, the result holds. We discuss the details of this next.
4.2.1 Fractional Logit
Although coeﬃcients estimated using OLS are straightforward to interpret, this regression
method may not be suitable since our dependent variable is an index that only takes values
between zero and one. However, due to its linear nature, OLS estimation can yield predictions
that are negative or greater than one. Thus, fractional logit regression, as described by Papke
and Wooldridge (1996), may be more suitable.
To implement this estimation technique, we assume a logistic functional form for the
conditional mean of our fragmentation measure. More explicitly, we assume:
E[ForFragp|Dp,ERAp,Xp] =
exp{αo + α1Dp + α2ERAp + α3DpERAp + Xpα4 + XpERApα5}
1 + exp{αo + α1Dp + α2ERAp + α3DpERAp + Xpα4 + XpERApα5}
.
Given this assumption, the parameters are estimated by quasi-maximum likelihood estima-
tion, where the quasi-log likelihood, lp, for a given observation p is:
lp = Fragp log
(
exp{αo + α1Dp + α2ERAp + α3DpERAp + Xpα4 + XpERApα5}





exp{αo + α1Dp + α2ERAp + α3DpERAp + Xpα4 + XpERApα5}
1 + exp{αo + α1Dp + α2ERAp + α3DpERAp + Xpα4 + XpERApα5}
)
.
Using this procedure yields estimates that must take values within the unit interval.
Panel B in Table 2 provides the marginal eﬀects of each variable speciﬁed in Equation 1
based on coeﬃcients estimated with fractional logit regressions.40 Evaluated at the sample
mean, the marginal eﬀect of each variable is very close in magnitude and signiﬁcance to the
40It is important to note that the marginal eﬀects are not simply given by the coeﬃcients estimated in our
fractional logit regressions. Since we assume a non-linear functional form for the conditional mean of the
dependant variable, we calculate the marginal eﬀects as suggested by Ai and Norton (2003). Furthermore,
to remain consistent with the exposition of the OLS estimates, the estimated marginal eﬀects of variables
not interacted with the ERAp variable show the marginal eﬀects these variables had on fragmentation in
Period 1. The marginal eﬀect of interacted variables show the change in the marginal eﬀect from Period 1
to Period 2.
20OLS estimates.41
4.2.2 Experience and Dispersion of Knowledge Outﬂows
The rapid rise in university patenting that occurred during the 1980s reﬂects signiﬁcant
change in the overall landscape with respect to academia’s approach to the management
of intellectual property. During this period, many universities that did not have a formal
technology transfer oﬃce established one and created standardized procedures for managing
the disclosure, patenting, and licensing process (Mowery et al. (2004)). In addition, much of
the increase in patent activity came from “inexperienced” institutions that had been issued
few patents prior to 1980.
The increasing role of these inexperienced institutions in university patenting inﬂuenced
the overall character of the “average” university patent. Indeed, the decrease in importance
and generality of university patents over time identiﬁed by Henderson et al. (1998) was shown
by Mowery et al. (2004) to be due to the entry of inexperienced schools. The implication of
the Mowery et al. ﬁnding is very important; since the measured decrease in importance and
generality was due to the entry of inexperienced universities, the eﬀect was likely temporary
while these schools learned to manage their intellectual property to become more like their
experienced counterparts.
Since our study is similar in spirit to these papers, it is incumbent upon us to also check
whether our eﬀect is a result of entry by inexperienced universities. To accomplish this we
categorize our university patents in a similar way to Mowery et al. We divide universities
into two categories based on their patenting experience prior to 1981. We deﬁne: (1) High
Experience Universities as those universities obtaining at least 10 patents that were applied
for after 1970 but before 1981, and (2) Low Experience Universities as those universities that
obtained less than 10 patents that were applied for during the same period.42 Based on this
41Similar results follow when we use double-sided tobit regressions.
42Though our categorization of universities is similar to Mowery et al. (2004), it is not identical. Speciﬁcally,
we do not distinguish between the less experienced institutions. Whereas Mowery et al. delineates between
universities with moderate experience (universities that obtained between one to nine patents that were
21categorization, experienced universities account for 87% (984) and 72% (1948) of the focal
university patents in Periods 1 and 2, respectively.
To examine the eﬀects of experience on knowledge outﬂows, we run essentially the same
regressions as in Table 2. The only diﬀerence is that we now break apart the university eﬀect
according to the level of university experience. We do this by using two university dummy
variables that diﬀerentiate between universities according to the categories of experience
described above.
The regression results in Table 3 show that the reduction in the breadth of knowledge
from university patents estimated in the prior section is not driven only by the entry of
inexperienced universities. In fact, the coeﬃcient on the interaction dummy (High experience
university * ERA) is highly signiﬁcant. This result suggests that the issue of interest, an
increase in the concentration of knowledge ﬂows associated with university patents, is at least
partly driven by experienced universities implying that, unlike the decline in importance and
generality, this is not likely a temporary phenomenon.
4.3 Regression Analysis: Diversity of Knowledge Inﬂows
We turn next to examine the concentration of knowledge inﬂows. Although the economic
forces aﬀecting the concentration of inﬂows are diﬀerent from those aﬀecting that of outﬂows,
as we described in the introduction, the econometric approach to identifying changes in
concentration is much the same.
We report the estimated coeﬃcients of Equation 1 for the knowledge inﬂows sample in
Table 4. Recall that the dependent variable in this case is BackFragi,p. Referencing the
fully speciﬁed model reported in Column IV, we see from the estimated coeﬃcient on the
university dummy that university patents in Period 1 are more fragmented than their private
applied for after 1970 but before 1981) and universities without experience (universities with zero patents
applied for during this time), we group these two categories into one. Also, our categorization diﬀers slightly
for two measurement reasons: (1) we only consider those patents that made at least two citations while
Mowery et al. considers all university patents; and (2) we include patents applied for by the University of
California, Stanford University and Columbia University while Mowery et al. excludes these universities.
22sector counterparts, even after controlling for the originality, technology ﬁeld, and overall
number of citations made. We refer to this diﬀerence – the degree to which knowledge inﬂows
used to develop patented university inventions are drawn from a less concentrated set of prior
art holders than those used by ﬁrms – as the university diversity premium.
Turning to the coeﬃcient on the interaction between the university dummy and the Period
2 dummy (ERA), we see that the university diversity premium is signiﬁcantly diminished by
the second period. In fact, by comparing the magnitudes of this coeﬃcient with the coeﬃcient
on the university dummy (with no interaction), we see that the university diversity premium
measured in Period 1 is reduced by approximately 67% by Period 2. By comparison, another
characteristic of university patents, their tendency to be more original than ﬁrm patents,
does not diminish but rather is further ampliﬁed over this period.
This is our main result with respect to the increasing concentration of knowledge inﬂows.
As before, we check for robustness in a number of ways. First, we show that the result
holds in various speciﬁcations of Equation 1, which are also reported in Panel A of Table
4. In addition, we estimate Equation 1 using Fractional Logit rather than OLS. The results
presented in Panel B are very similar to those generated by OLS.43 We also conﬁrm that
the ﬁnding holds using the diﬀerent procedures for handling unassigned patents described
above. Furthermore, the result holds when we use ﬁner technology class ﬁxed eﬀects based
on the USPTO three-digit classiﬁcation system.
4.3.1 Experience and the Dispersion of Knowledge Inﬂows
For the reasons outlined in Section 4.2.2 above, we must check whether the decline in the
university diversity premium measured here is the result of entry by institutions that were less
experienced at managing intellectual property. Recall that this issue is important since if the
decline is due to the entry of inexperienced universities, the eﬀect is likely temporary while
these schools learn to manage their intellectual property like their experienced counterparts.
43Similar results follow when we use double-sided tobit regressions.
23As before, we deﬁne the universities in our data as either high or low experience. Based
on this categorization, experienced universities account for 81% (982) and 61% (2694) of the
focal university patents in Periods 1 and 2, respectively.
To examine the eﬀects of experience on knowledge inﬂows, we run essentially the same
regressions as in Table 4. The only diﬀerence is that we again break apart the university
eﬀect according to the level of university experience. We do this by using two university
dummy variables that diﬀerentiate between high and low experienced universities.
The regression results in Table 5 show that the reduction in diversity of knowledge sources
used in developing patented university inventions estimated in Section 4.3 is not driven only
by the entry of inexperienced universities. In fact, the coeﬃcient on the interaction dummy
(High Experience university * ERA) is highly signiﬁcant. While the negative value of the
interaction coeﬃcient is slightly greater for inexperienced universities in terms of magnitude,
it is not signiﬁcant at the 10% level, whereas the coeﬃcient on the interaction term for
experienced universities is signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Most importantly though, this result
suggests that the issue of interest, an increase in the concentration of knowledge ﬂows into
university patents, is at least partly driven by experienced universities, suggesting that this
is not likely a temporary phenomenon.
4.4 Interpretation of Fragmentation Index Values
The meaning of the fragmentation index, the basis of our dependent variables, can be diﬃcult
to comprehend. Similar to the Herﬁndahl index, which, although often used in market
concentration studies is usually accompanied by more intuitive “four ﬁrm concentration
ratios,” the fragmentation index is complex. This is because many states of the world (e.g.,
combinations of citation frequencies and assignee distributions) can generate similar values.
Although the index is complicated, however, it is important to understand. Throughout most
of the discussion so far, we have described changes in university knowledge ﬂow concentration
in relative terms. In other words, we have discussed the change in the university premium
24rather than the absolute change in the concentration of university knowledge ﬂows. While the
relative change in concentration between periods seems large (> 50%), the absolute change
seems small (< 3%). Ultimately, we are interested in whether the change is economically
important. To this end, we oﬀer three distinct ways of interpreting the fragmentation index
to help the reader develop intuition for comprehending the economic signiﬁcance of the
estimated changes in knowledge ﬂow concentrations.
4.4.1 Distribution of Assignees across a Single Patent
Consider a patent that receives eight citations, roughly the mean number of citations re-
ceived by focal patents in our sample. Further, suppose these citations are from ﬁve diﬀerent
assignees. If three diﬀerent assignees each cite the patent twice while the remaining two as-
signees only cite the patent once, then the fragmentation measure equals 0.89.44 To increase
the fragmentation measure by 0.04 (approximately the value of the coeﬃcient on the univer-
sity dummy) while holding constant the total number of citations, one additional assignee
would have to cite the patent (now six unique assignees, rather than ﬁve). In this case, two
assignees would each cite the patent twice while four would each cite the patent once. With
this distribution, the fragmentation would increase to about 0.93.45
4.4.2 Distribution of Average versus Perfectly Concentrated Patents
Suppose there are two periods in which university patents are issued: Period 1 and Period
2. Further suppose that all Period 1 patents are average in terms of concentration (i.e., they
have the average fragmentation value). However, in Period 2, patents are either average or
perfectly concentrated (i.e., fragmentation = 0). To develop intuition for interpreting the
meaning of our estimated coeﬃcients, we calculate what fraction of patents must be perfectly
concentrated in order to obtain the observed drop in the average fragmentation value from
Period 1 to Period 2.










25Speciﬁcally, we use the fractional logit procedure to estimate the relationship between a
patent’s fragmentation, fragp, and the same patent’s characteristics, (ERAp,Xp):
fragp = F(αo + α1ERAp + Xpβ) + εp.
Note that, for simplicity, no variable is interacted with the period eﬀect, ERAp, as was done
in the speciﬁcations reported earlier. Here we assume the relationship between all control
variables and fragp does not change over time.
To estimate the absolute decrease in fragmentation, ∆, we ﬁnd the estimated marginal
eﬀect of ERAp. Since ERAp is a dummy variable that equals one for any patent, p, in Period
2 and zero otherwise, the marginal eﬀect is given by:
∆ = F(ˆ αo + ˆ α1 + X ˆ β) − F(ˆ αo + X ˆ β).
∆ is calculated at the sample mean, X, to remain consistent with the estimated marginal
eﬀects found in the main tables above.
Finally, since patents in Period 2 can only have a fragmentation value equal to F(ˆ α+ ˆ βX)
(the “average” level of fragmentation in the Period 1) and zero (perfectly concentrated ﬂows),
we need to determine the number of patents, Y , out of a total of T patents in Period
2 that must have perfectly concentrated knowledge ﬂows to cause the change in average
fragmentation, ∆. That is, we solve:
(T − Y )F(ˆ αo + X ˆ β) + (Y )0
T






F(ˆ αo + X ˆ β)
.
Recalling that in Period 1 all university patents have fragmentation equal to F(ˆ αo + X ˆ β)
implies that the propensity of patents with perfectly concentrated knowledge ﬂows increased
26from 0 to Y
T .
Thus, from Table 6 we see that our estimated changes imply the following. For the
knowledge outﬂows case, if there are 100 patents in Period 1 that all have the average level of
fragmentation, in Period 2 approximately 96 will still have the average level of fragmentation,
while four will be perfectly concentrated (i.e., all citations come from a single assignee).
For the knowledge inﬂows case, only one patent will be perfectly concentrated. Clearly,
the estimated changes in concentration are likely not the result of perfect concentration
(i.e., rather than 4% of the focal patents being perfectly concentrated, a larger percentage
might be moderately more concentrated than average) but this simple dichotomy allows for
developing intuition regarding the economic implications of our ﬁndings.
4.4.3 Distribution of Average Firm versus Perfectly Fragmented Patents
In our ﬁnal illustrative example, we compare university patents to those of ﬁrms. Suppose
all ﬁrm patents have the same level of fragmentation, Fragf. Suppose also that university
patents can take two values of fragmentation, either Fragf or one (the latter case implies
perfect fragmentation such that all citations come from unique assignees). Our data indicate
that the average fragmentation of university patents, Fragu, is greater than that of ﬁrm
patents such that fragu = fragf + ∆ where ∆ > 0.
In this example, we ask, given the assumptions described above, what must the distribu-
tion of university fragmentation be (i.e., proportion where fragmentation is Fragf versus 1)
to generate an average level of fragmentation that is ∆ greater than that of ﬁrm patents?
We address this with a simple exercise.
Randomly draw T university patents. Let Y be the number of these T patents with
fragmentation equal to 1 and consequently T-Y is the number of patents with fragmentation
equal to Fragf. Thus, we want to know: What fraction of the university patent sample (i.e.,
Y
T ) must have a fragmentation equal to one such that the average university fragmentation
is greater than the average ﬁrm fragmentation by ∆. That is, what does Y
T have to be such
27that
Fragu =
Y + (T − Y )Fragf
T








Given our estimates of the coeﬃcients on the university dummy variables and the sample
fragmentation means for ﬁrm patents, we ﬁnd the following for knowledge outﬂows (i.e.,
forward fragmentation). Initially, in Period 1, university fragmentation is greater by about
0.027 (the estimated value of the university dummy variable in Table 2 Column (VIII)) and
the sample mean of ﬁrm fragmentation is 0.879 (i.e., the sample mean of ﬁrm patents in
Period 1, shown in Table 1). This implies that 22 out of 100 university patents are perfectly
fragmented in Period 1 compared to only six in Period 2.46
For knowledge inﬂows, we use the estimated initial fragmentation diﬀerence between ﬁrm
and university patents, which is 0.02 (the estimated value of the university dummy variable
in Table 4 Column (VIII)) and the sample mean of ﬁrm fragmentation of 0.903 (the sample
mean of ﬁrm patents in Period 1 shown in Table 1). Using these values, we calculate that
approximately 21 out of 100 university patents are perfectly fragmented in Period 1 compared
to only seven in Period 2.47
5 Conclusion
The dramatic rise in the level of university patenting that occurred during the 1980s has
been examined along a variety of dimensions. Ours is the ﬁrst study to our knowledge that
has sought to determine whether the increasing trend towards formal intellectual property
protection has restricted the breadth of knowledge ﬂows. Our ﬁndings suggest that it has.
46In Period 2, the diﬀerence in university-ﬁrm fragmentation is 0.027-0.019=0.008 and the ﬁrm sample
mean is 0.867.
47In Period 2, the diﬀerence in university-ﬁrm fragmentation is 0.020-0.014=0.006 and the ﬁrm sample
mean is 0.908.
28However, although the magnitude of the increase in concentration of university knowledge
ﬂows is large relative to ﬁrms, the absolute changes are modest. Also important is that
the changes are at least partly driven by universities that were experienced at patenting,
suggesting that the identiﬁed eﬀect is likely not temporary.
What are the broader implications of these ﬁndings? There could be many explanations
and we are cautious about pushing too hard on any one interpretation of our results. How-
ever, we close by drawing on the literature to speculate about some potential causes to oﬀer
context for our ﬁndings.
In terms of knowledge outﬂows, our results suggest that not only might behaviors associ-
ated with patenting limit the level of dissemination of knowledge ﬂows as shown by Murray
and Stern (2005), these behaviors might also limit the breadth of dissemination. In the
university setting, this could occur at either or both of two levels: the technology licensing
oﬃce and/or the inventor.
To the extent technology licensing oﬃces shift their objective function from dissemination-
maximization (leading to predominantly non-exclusive, widely licensed patents) to proﬁt-
maximization (leading to predominantly narrowly licensed patents), we would observe a
decrease in forward fragmentation, consistent with our ﬁndings. It seems plausible that such
a shift could occur given that performance metrics for the latter are much easier to measure.
One could also imagine how plausible changes in inventor behavior could result in the
ﬁndings reported here. Due to the early stage nature of most university inventions, the trans-
fer of tacit knowledge is particularly important for commercial development (likely leading
to the creation of follow-on inventions that also will be patented and may cite the original
patent). Such tacit knowledge is often most eﬃciently transferred through direct interaction
with the inventor (Jensen and Thursby (2001); Agrawal (2006)). To the extent that inventors
become more commercially oriented regarding the management of their intellectual property,
and the ﬁndings of Lach and Schankerman (2005) suggest this is not unlikely, their tendency
to share tacit knowledge with others who are not licensees may diminish.
29Alternatively, a shift in inventor research behavior, rather than dissemination behavior,
could also generate our ﬁndings. To the extent that faculty change the nature of their
research such that the resultant inventions are only applicable to a more narrow range of
subsequent users, this could explain our ﬁndings. However, it is important to recall that we
employ technology ﬁeld ﬁxed eﬀects such that our results are not driven by changes from,
say, chemistry to biotechnology where the set of potential knowledge users might be more
concentrated. Furthermore, we control for generality such that our results are not driven by
a change in research projects towards less general inventions that are therefore applicable
to a smaller set of ﬁrms. Thus, only a particular type of change in research behavior, that
results in inventions that are within the same ﬁeld and equally general but for other reasons
are only applicable to a more concentrated set of users, would cause the phenomenon we
identify.
In terms of knowledge inﬂows, our results suggest that the breadth of assignees that
inventors draw upon in developing their own inventions diminished over time. Although it
is diﬃcult to imagine how this could be a direct result of changes in behavior by technology
licensing oﬃces, an explanation based on changes in inventor behavior is reasonably straight-
forward. If inventors become more commercially oriented and savvy over time, they may
increasingly look forward and anticipate that, to the extent that future licensees are exposed
to anti-commons problems associated with access to complementary inventions, the value of
their inventions will be diminished. As such, inventors reason back and plan their research
program in a manner that minimizes anti-commons exposure by reducing the breadth of
prior art citations. This seems reasonable given that university researchers have been shown
to respond to economic incentives (Lach and Schankerman (2005)).
It is important to note that although it is tempting to assume that higher concentrations
of knowledge inﬂows and particularly outﬂows are welfare reducing, this is not necessarily
true. Knowing that knowledge spillovers contribute to economic growth (Romer (1986);
Romer (1990)) but also recognizing the importance of exclusivity for creating incentives to
30develop and commercialize, it is unclear how increased concentration of university knowledge
ﬂows aﬀects welfare. What is clear, however, is that what we learn from further study of
this topic will oﬀer important insight for science policy and economic growth.
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42Table 6: Change in Propensity of University Patents to have Perfectly Concentrated Knowl-
edge Flows
Backward Knowledge Flows Forward Knowledge Flows
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (I) (II) (III) (IV)
Period 1 Average 0.921 0.920 0.926 0.925 0.910 0.912 0.911 0.913
Period 2 Average 0.914 0.914 0.916 0.916 0.869 0.869 0.874 0.874
Y
T 0.007 0.007 0.011 0.010 0.045 0.047 0.041 0.043
-Note: The Roman numerals in the table coincide with the speciﬁcations
of our regression equations reported above (i.e. in terms of the use of originality and citations
made for the knowledge inﬂows case and generality and citations received
for the outﬂows case.).
43